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Abstract 
Very Large Scale Systems (VLSS) play a powerfbl role in shaping what an 
organization does and can do in a practical sense. VLSS are deeply embedded in the 
organizational procedures, business plans, and strategies. These systems evolve over long 
periods of time, often not according to some rational plan, and for a limited time they 
provide a significant competitive advantage over other firms. In the long run, however, 
VLSS become strategic liabilities and must be rebuilt. 
Many organizations experience great difficulty rebuilding n S S .  Indeed, most 
organizations attempt to avoid rebuilding VLSS until the last possible moment. Often, the 
organization is in a state of crisis, a strategic transition. Because of the complexity and 
size of VLSS, existing methodologies often are not helpful. To make matters worse, the 
typical management incentive structure discourages rebuilding VLSS. 
In a typical VLSS effort, participants soon discover that they must rebuild the 
organization in order to take full advantage of new technologies. A major organizational 
engineering effort is often required. Senior management as well as systems management 
routinely underestimate the complexity of the task before them. Consequently, large 
errors are made in estimating costs and time. 
Drawing on research in both the private and public sector, this paper examines why 
VLSS fail, why are VLSS so difficult to  rebuild, what are the strategy options, and how 
can senior management guide the rebuilding processs. 
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CIOs Beware: Very Large Scale Systems Projects 
In 1982 the Social Security Administration began a 500 million dollar, ten year 
program to rebuild its core information systems. A well known Big Eight accounting firm 
wrote the plan, and one of the country's most experienced systems integration company 
was hired to manage the process. The project was touted as a flagship Reagan era 
example of how to do things right with modern computer technology, experienced 
business designers, and a powerkl integration manager. New software, hardware, 
databases and communications were promised. 
By 1988 the project was cancelled with Congressional auditors claiming it was a 
failure, and SSA management claiming limited success. To be sure new hardware and 
telecommunications hardware was in place. But there was little progress in writing new 
software or developing a modern database. Employment at SSA had been squeezed down 
to 67,000 employees from 78,000 in 1982. But complaints from employees were rising 
rapidly as the agency tried to demonstrate productivity gains from its technology 
investment. Worse, the way you and your parents actually obtain social security benefits 
is largely unchanged---you still trudge down to the district office and fill out an 
application. 
As a consultant to the OEce of Technology Assessment, I worked from 1985 to 
1986 trying to answer the 500 million dollar question on many Congressmen's mind: 
would SSA succeed in rebuilding its systems? AAer a year's work our team finally 
developed a consensus that, "No", SSA would most likely not succeed despite the 
massive investment in hardware and telecommunications.' 
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After many months of investigation it became clear that the Big Eight Accounting 
firm and the experienced systems integrator had developed a plan to automate the existing 
procedures of SSA and had failed entirely to re-think how SSA should be doing business 
in the 1990's. The basic procedures of the agency, the business procedures built by the 
Social Security Administration of 1936, remain fkndamentally unchanged. Of course, now 
these 1936 procedures are implemented on very fast state of the art computers. 
It was also clear that the 1982 senior management of the agency, management and 
systems personnel at the accounting firm and the systems integration firm, as well as 
Congressmen and their staffs, had seriously underestimated the complexity and cost of re- 
writing 12 million lines of computer code, and rearranging the basic files of SSA into a 
modern computer database. 
No one seemed to understand in the period 1982-1987 that they were dealing with 
a relatively new problem: rebuilding very large scale systems (VLSS). No one seemed to 
understand that in order to take advantage of the new information technologies, one has to 
re-think completely the business procedures, rules, practices, and even values. Just as one 
has to design products for modern manufacturing, so to must one design business 
organizations for contemporary information technology. 
After this experience we became more aware that many organizations in both the 
private and public sector were experiencing difficulties with very large scale systems 
rebuilding. Below are some examples of the difficulties which large systems pose for 
organizations. 
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Some Infamous Government VLSS 
*The IRS has been rebuilding the tax transaction systems since 1978. Called by 
various names like the "new Tax Administration System," and the "Tax System 
Redesign," IRS has spent over a billion dollars trying to rebuild. A recent critical 
report by Congressional auditors found the new systems cannot last beyond the 
early 1990's and a U.S. Senate Finance Committee Chairman called the effort a 
"Train Wreck" about to happem2 
*The FBI has been trying to build a national electronic network to exchange 
criminal history records among the states for the last decade. After expending 
about one billion dollars, only ten states contribute records to the electronic files. 
*In 1983 the U.S. Patent Ofice awarded a $293 million 
19 year [sic] contract to Planning Research Corporation of McLean Virginia to 
rebuild the old patent storage and search system in which patent records are stored 
in wooden boxes. In 1989 the system was four years behind schedule, did not 
work at all, the completion cost estimate was $600 million, and the delivery date 
1994.3 
*The grand daddy of all system sink holes is of course the Department of Defense 
World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWNICCS--pronounced 
"Wimmics). Under the carehl management of the Air Force. This system was 
begun in 1966 as a federation of 158 different computer systems using 30 different 
software systems at 81 different locations. After one billion dollars in 
expenditures, and literally hundreds of studies, there is still no agreement on the 
architecture or information requirements! 
The system has been judged by the General Accounting Office to be a failure, with 
a management structure "so complex and fragmented that no one central 
organization or individual has a complete overview of the program. "' 
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Some Infamous VLSS in the Private Sector 
*A major insurance company started out in 1982 to re-build its policy issuance 
system from a batch system to an on-line system driven directly from the agents 
desktop computer. This would automate completely the process of issuing new 
policies, and permit the introduction of new types of products within one month as 
opposed to the traditional three years or so. 
A well known systems integration firm was hired to develop software and install it 
on the firms hardware, as well as assume consulting and integration roles. The 
target date was 1987 and the price tag $8 million. The project is still not finished, 
the target date is 1993, and the price tag is $15 million.' 
*A major mini-computer manufacturer was well known for its chaotic order 
processing and billing system. In 1981 the company hired a small but well known 
consulting firm to rebuild the order entry system in cooperation with the MIS 
department. The original contract called for an 18 month delivery and a price of 
14 million dollars. In 1985 the project was finally cancelled and was costing 10 
million a year in direct costs, plus indirect costs of customers lost due to faulty 
billing. 
*A major American Bank attempted to re-design the Bank's Employee Benefits 
and Trust Services Division. After several years of effort, a cost to the Bank of 
45 million dollars, the project ended in failure in 1988.6 
*A major Midwestern health care insurance provider hired a systems integrator to 
re-build the firms seven different claims processing systems and three different 
membership systems for $200 million dollars. The project was completed on 
schedule 18 months later but it did not work. The system created $60 million in 
overpayments and lost 35,000 customers before being unplugged. 
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A Private Sector Example: VLSS: MultiChem's Experience 
1 MultiChem is an international manufacturer of chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and 
dyestuffs, with 3 divisions and 20 operating units scattered throughout the U. S. It 
employs 20,000 employees of whom 7000 are unionized. Numerous acquisitions during 
the late 1970's could not be handled by the corporation's core Personnel information 
system, which had already been extensively modified and patched. 
The corporation embarked on an ambitious Grand Design to build a new Human 
Resources Information System that would automate all of the firm's Human Resources 
activities. In addition to providing on-line real-time personnel processing in a state-of-the 
art technical environment, the proposed system would automate all of the firm's Benefits 
plans, plus track positions and organizational relationships for manpower planning. 
The project never proceeded beyond the requirements-gathering stage because the 
organizational complexity was too overwhelming. There were 2 major compensation 
evaluation systems, 32 pension plans, 70 insurance plans, and an Investment Savings Plan 
with complex securities valuations to automate. The old Personnel system had been 
designed to be a major supplier of employee data to other systems--Payroll, Benefits and 
the firm's Investment Savings Plan. These systems were linked by elaborate and often 
heavily manual interfaces, that were poorly documented and understoood. Twelve 
separate interfaces had to be constructed for the firm's disparate Payroll systems alone. In 
many instances the COBOL code from the old system had to be utilized to reconstruct 
fine-grained requirements because end-users overlooked many important details. 
Analysts from the project proposed streamlining the system by "rationalizing" 
some of the firm's plans and procedures--consolidating pension plans, reducing the numbe~ 
of Insurance plans, forcing all operating units to use the same Payroll system. But senior 
management refused, fearing "political" backlash from profitable acquisitions and 
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operating units that insisted on doing things their way. After four 
years and expenditures of over $5 million, the project had only produced a prototype for 
positions tracking, a pension processing system that didn't work, and three thousand pages 
of design specifications. The project was cancelled. Senior management insisted that 
Human Resources develop a strategic business plan before any new systems projects 
proceed. 
The project never proceeded beyond the requirements-gathering stage because the 
organizational complexity was too overwhelming. There were 2 major compensation 
evaluation systems, 32 pension plans, 70 insurance plans, and an Investment Savings Plan 
with complex securities valuations to automate. The old Personnel system had been 
designed to be a major supplier of employee data to other systems--Payroll, Benefits and 
the firm's Investment Savings Plan. These systems were linked by elaborate and often 
heavily manual interfaces, that were poorly documented and understoood. Twelve 
separate interfaces had to be constructed for the firm's disparate Payroll systems alone. In 
many instances the COBOL code from the old system had to be utilized to reconstruct 
fine-grained requirements because end-users overlooked many important details. 
Analysts from the project proposed streamlining the system by "rationalizing" 
some of the firm's plans and procedures--consolidating pension plans, reducing the number 
~f Insurance plans, forcing all operating units to use the same Payroll system. But senior 
management reksed, fearing "political" backlash from profitable acquisitions and 
~perating units that insisted on doing things their way. 
After four years and expenditures of over $5 million, the project had only 
produced a prototype for positions tracking, a pension processing system that didn't work, 
snd three thousand pages of design specifications. The project was cancelled. Senior 
management insisted that Human Resources develop a strategic business plan before any 
new systems projects proceed. 
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What is it about very large scale systems that causes them to fail in the first place? 
Why can't VLSS systems keep operating forever? Why--in this day and age--are VLSS so 
difficult to rebuild? What are the strategic options to consider when rebuilding VLSS? 
How can senior management be sure that the right questions have been asked and the right 
direction chosen? 
Back to Basics: What is a VLSS? 
At the outset it is important to see that VLSS are hndamentally a dif3erent kind of 
system from the normal run-of-the-mill, nickel and dime computer system. Unfortunately, 
the existing academic literature makes little or no distinction between a VLSS behemoth 
involving 200-300 systems personnel, millions of lines of code, and a ten year 
development trajectory and a new sales management system with twenty systems 
personnel, 10,000 lines of code, and a one year development path.' 
There are two kinds of definitions of VLSS. Technical definitions describe VLSS 
in terms of lines of code, the number of computer hours required to process the 
application, the number of daily transactions, the number of records, files, and so forth. 
While interesting and usehl once other problems are solved, technical definitions generally 
fail to grasp the essence of VLSS. 
Technical definitions tend to produce technical solutions such as CASE tools 
(Computer Aided System Engineering), programmer workbenches, purchasing more 
computer and communications hardware. Generally, these technical solutions are 
peripheral to the problem, but they are nevertheless extremely popular. Armed with 
slogans like "software engineering," managers are misled in the belief that they are 
attacking the problem with modern tools.8 
A second type of definition is organizational. In organizational definitions VLSS 
have the following characteristics: 
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*They play a dominant role in shaping the organizational metaphor of production 
and service delivery. They are rooted in the culture of the company. 
*They are deeply embedded in the thousands of day-to-day organizational 
procedures. VLSS are the standard operating procedures. These systems are in 
every sense a strategic asset to the company, and play a strategic role by creating 
some comparative advantages that are hard to duplicate. At the same time, these 
systems--as we see below--VLSS become strategic liabilities as they age. 
*VLSS directly control the information flow of central "core" activities in the 
organization. [See panel for illustration of "core" activities and VLSS] 
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Picture: "Core" Organizational Activities, Spin-offs, and Systems" 
Caption: At the heart of every large, contemporary organization is a database, or 
collection of data files, which have developed over decades. These files reflect the 
predominant business metaphor: what products are made and how, who is the customer, 
and how is product distributed. 
All organizations develop a central institutional "core" over time--a collection of a few 
products, activities, and services which are the predominant focus of organizational life. 
Supporting each core activity are Very Large Scale Systems. 
Over long periods of time, organizations develop "spin offs" from the central core in blips, 
drabs, and major trickles. Supporting VLSS take on additional complexity as they support 
these spin-offs. 
*They directly involve the vast majority of the employees. 
*They involve powefi l  organizational units. Therefore they are bound in the 
politics of the organization. 
*They are intellectually complex because of shear size and because no one 
individual, or small group of individuals, can adequately understand them. 
Knowledge of the system is widespread, but inherently not collective or   ha red.^ 
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An Example of VLSS Complexity 
SSA operates with a Program Operations Manual of approximately 40,000 pages. 
One can think of this manual as the definitive standard operating procedures for SSA 
because it expresses all the formal, legal rules for arriving at SSA eligiblity. 2,000 pages 
are changed each month and 40,000 field employees attempt to keep up with these 
monthly changes. 
Most of the 40,000 pages in the Program Operations Manual is bound up in the 12 
million lines of SSA software code which issues SSA numbers, tracks earnings, establishes 
eligibility, and retains the master beneficiary records. 
In organizations like these, much of what is done and can be done on a daily basis 
is shaped by the capabilities and performance of their VLSS. In VLSS, there is a "tight 
couple" between business procedure and strategies, and the firms VLSS hardware, 
telecommunications, software, and database. 
Picture: A "tightly coupled" relationship between and an organization's business rules, 
procedures, personnel and strategies with VLSS software, hardware, telecommunications, 
and database. 
These social definitions of VLSS grasp the complexity of the problem but tend --as 
we see below-- not to lead to any clear cut, decisive, or clean "solutions." There are no 
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quick "technical fixes" for the problems raised by re-building VLSS. Organizational 
definitions tend to support unpopular and difficult solutions to the problem of VLSS. 
How Many VLSS Are There? 
Virtually all Fortune 1000 firms more than 10 years old have at least one VLSS, 
many have a collection of such systems. Peat Marwick Mitchell and Co. has built a 35 
million dollar a year business trying to re-build VLSS. It surveyed 600 of its clients in 
1987 and found that most had at least one VLSS, and that 35% of the firms had at least 
one "runaway" VLSS rebuilding project in which a VLSS Project was years behind 
schedule and millions over budget.'' 
Where do VLSS Come From? 
Most organizations do not live long enough to  experience the pain of having to 
rebuild VL,SS. Briefly, a VLSS which evolved in the 19601s, or even the 19501s, can live 
on and provide support for an organization indefinitely so as long as the environment of 
the organization does not materially change. Because the average life span of a business 
organization is less than ten years, the original VLSS are usually sufficient to last the 
lifetime of the corporation. ' ' 
Ironically, it is only the small number of very successfbl organizations who live 
longer than ten years who experience the pain of having to rebuild VLSS. 
Almost all VLSS evolve over long periods of time and virtually no historically 
existing VLSS more than five years old were "built" in the sense of being the result of 
singular, conscious, intentional, organizational efforts to produce a "system". [As it turns 
out, this fact provides a critical insight into how to rebuild VLSS described below]. 
The airlines reservation systems, and virtually all actual "strategic" systems about 
which we know, evolve over long periods of time. VLSS evolve in spurts, and in patches, 
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as they respond to more and more unplanned demands to exapand so that new activities 
can be supported. Not until the 1980s are VLSS being rebuilt as a part of well structured 
plans." 
The evolutionary character of VLSS means that over time they accrue new 
unplanned functions; their internal structure becomes a lattice work of interdependencies, 
most completely undocumented. Early designers retire, and latecomes know only specific 
knctions of the system. An overall perspective on the VLSS is lost in the dim past. 
Why do Existing VLSS Fail: Strategic Transitions 
Organizations usually rebuild VLSS when they are in a state of crisis. Because 
decision making in an organizational crisis is usually worse, and certainly no better, than in 
"normal times," the odds of managers making the right decisions during the crisis are 
slight.I3 Indeed, because the existing lot of managers was at the helm as the crisis 
developed, they are often the least capable of solving the problem. 
The existing VLSS is usually not the cause of the crisis, but it is directly involved. 
Typically the organizational crisis occurs because the environment has shifted and no 
longer supports the organization. 
Deregulation, new competition, the appearance of new technology pursued 
vigorously by competitors, changing public tastes, and so forth are typical of the kinds of 
environmental changes and discontinuities which make existing business procedures, 
products, services, and strategies irrelevant and no longer usehl. 
In this environment of discontinuity, the old VLSS is typically stretched to its 
limits and is being asked to do impossible things. Most VLSS can do "impossible" things, 
things never intended, by virtue of dedicated staff willing to work on week ends and 
nights. 
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But eventually not even these crisis tactics work the simple, basic hnctions 
performed by the system like cutting checks, tracking sales, inventory control, transaction 
process of orders becomes dubious. 
Faced with this crisis, organizations must come up with new procedures, business 
rules, and indeed an entire new organizational metaphor of what they do. What is needed 
is a new vision of how to do business, what to produce, how to deliver the product or 
service, and how to use new information technology to support the new vision. Needless 
to say, the organization will have to rebuild its VLSS to support the new business. We 
can call this period a strategic transition. 
Why Don't Managers Rebuild VLSS Before the Crisis? 
In most VLSS failures, managers see the crisis develop long before it happens. 
There is almost always a long lead time from the first signs of trouble in a VLSS to its 
ultimate collapse. Researchers have found that it takes at least five years, often longer, to 
really kill off an organization.14 This leads to the question, "Why don't managers and 
organizations do something before the storm hits?" 
Because organizations are so dependent on VLSS, and because they are so 
immensely complex, expensive, and troublesome, most rational managers and most short 
term rational organizations will avoid rebuilding them in any serious way unless absolutely 
necessary. 
In most organizations the managerial incentive structure is not supportive of 
rebuilding VLSS. In general, VLSS rebuild projects take from 3-10 years. In this time 
frame, managers who start the painhl rebuild are rarely around to reap the rewards. 
Those who come on the project late are liable to be blamed for the likely failure. Hence 
most politically astute managers will avoid the assignment. In other words, VLSS have a 
difTerent life cycle than managers. 
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The organizational incentive structure is also not supportive. At the organizational 
level, truly immense investments are required over long periods of unpredictable time and 
the rewards--if any-- usually cannot be calculated in any believable way. It's a roll of the 
dice. Most large rational organizations will avoid rolling the dice. 
What happens when VLSS Fail? 
Because VLSS are so entwined with the value chain of activities, and the value 
chains of suppliers and customers, rebuilding them is inherently risky. Small mistakes can 
amplify throughout the chain of related activities, drastically effecting suppliers, and 
customers, not to mention one's own organization. 
Patches of existing systems rather than rebuilds are the typical response to the first 
signs of trouble. Patches are politically acceptable because they require no great 
organizational change. 
Why the Old Systems Development Life Cycle Won't Work 
One of the most dangerous pitfalls to avoid in this situation is to turn to the tried 
and true techniques developed in the 1950's for building systems. Called the "systems 
development life cycle", this traditional technique calls for systems people to study the old 
information system, investigate the "information requirements" of the organization, and 
design a rational solution. 
This all sounds good until you get down into the trenches. For instance, there are 
no requirements statements on the old system, there is no book where you can find out 
how the old system works--its all in the heads of thousands of people because as the 
VLSS grew over the years no one really documented the system. This means you often 
have to look at 100,000 lines of code to figure out what is happening in the system. 
If we assume that one skilled-programmer analyst can understand and document 
about 20 lines of code per day (a generous assessment and about the same as he could 
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write new code), and if we assume a VLSS with say 2 million lines of code, then it would 
a team of twenty programmers about 21 years just to figure out how the old system 
works! If we triple the productivity of programmer/analysts from current levels 
(something nobody even envisages actually happening with CASE tools), then the task 
would only take seven years. By that time of course, the organization will be dead. 
For instance, SSA hired a very prestigious accounting firm to conduct a so-called 
"enterprise wide information analysis" of how SSA's existing 1982 systems worked, and 
what information requirements the old system fulfilled. the study itself took two years and 
three million dollars. It took SSA another year to develop a statement of what the 
requirements were for the old organization. After three years, no one could understand 
the information requirements statement however because it took up thirty feet on a book 
shelf! The study has remain unused as SSA later decided to develop entirely new systems 
based on contemporary views of how to conduct business. The old ways--and their 
information requirements--were essentially irrelevant. 
Briefly, the intellectual complexity of the existing VLSS are so great, that several 
years will be required just to understand them in some formal sense. By that time it is 
often too late, and it is almost always irrelevant to know how ancient business practices 
were performed with outdated computer technology. 
The idea that VLSS evolve overlong periods of time is a critical insight here 
because it means that just about any intentional or conscious plan to re-build such systems 
will be simplistic, even naive, and fail to capture the full functionality of the existing 
VLSS. Imagine designing a plant, say an orchid, given some DNA. 
Second, there's a difference between "Doing something according to plan" and 
"creating the conditions for something to grow and flourish." In the traditional systems 
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development life cycle, we try to do something according to plan. This is a civil 
engineering technique suitable for bridging gaps across rivers with bridges. 
The nice thing about land masses is that they don't change much in the short term 
of a few centuries. But the analogy may be inappropriate. Information systems have to be 
built for uncertain future environments which change in a few months, years. 
Biological analogies--as opposed to civil engineering metaphors-- may provide a 
better to guide to choosing a proper VLSS rebuilding strategy. What we need is a 
systems development life cycle methodology which can evolve flexible robust systems 
over, say, ten year time frames. 
What we need to start with is a vision of how to do business five or ten years from 
now, and build for that future environment. Where can we get that vision? Let's examine 
the realistic choices facing senior management. 
What  are  the re-building strategies? 
We need to consider three dimensions: the organization, the technology, and 
strategy [see box]. 
Picture: Policy Matrix. 
Caption: All VLSS rebuilding strategies can be analysed using a three dimension policy 
matrix. 
We can understand any strategy chosen better by placing it in this three 
dimensional space. All VLSS rebuilding strategies involve some change in organizational 
structure and process--some more than others. All strategies involve some change in the 
technology platform--the collection of computers, telecommunications, and databases. 
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Policy Matrix 
ess 
Technology 
Platform 
Change 
Organizational Process Change 
The strategies themselves have different characteristics of risk, reward, and 
resistance (popularity). In general, as we move out the strategy vector, risk increases but 
so does reward (effectiveness). Unfortunately, resistance increases as well. Lets examine 
six common VLSS strategies using this matrix. 
Feasibility study 
In the short term a low risk possibility is to spend six months to a year studying the 
problem. Sometimes inaction is the best action. Some problems do go away, others solve 
themselves, and others simply need a new crew of managers and professionals which takes 
time. If you can afford inaction for a year, you should try to identifjr the precise nature of 
the VLSS problem: people, technology, and organization. 
Let's Go Shopping 
The most common short term survival strategy is to go shopping for the biggest, 
fastest, and most powerfbl mainframe machines available. In the trade this is called the 
"unlimited MIPS" or "Big Iron" strategy and it is of course a favorite among systems 
people, all technology lovers, vendors of mainframes, as well as most system integrators. 
Generally, this strategy involves minimal organizational change, sometimes significant 
technology pIatform change, and moderate short term effectiveness with low risk. 
On the positive side this strategy buys time for large "embedded base" systems in a 
state of crisis. As a survival strategy, bigger machines can process the old software and 
the old files as much as ten times faster, relieving backlogs, unclogging communications 
channels, and increasing service to customers. Moreover, this strategy fits in with a 
manager's life cycle: a "turnaround" of sorts can be produced in 18 months to 3 years. 
On the down side this strategy involves a tremendous financial commitment to the 
old software, the old business procedures embedded in the software, and the entire 
business metaphor of the past. If you want to be doing business 5 to 7 years from now 
(the expected life of "new" systems) the same way you do business now, then this is the 
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strategy for you. Many years from now you will find yourself locked into a centralized, 
mainframe architecture, operating software now twenty years old, with little capability to 
accommodate changes in the market place. 
Salami: one bite at a tinze. 
One approach to large systems is to cut them up into smaller systems. The idea 
behind salami is to break up huge W S S  into component parts, and rebuild the parts one 
at a time. This strategy recognizes that "Big Iron" is not itself the answer and that some 
serious redesign of the business is in order. At the same, salanzi recognizes that most 
businesses do not have a comprehensive vision of how they want to do business in the 
future, and even if they did, it would be too risky to try to implement the entire vision all 
at once. Better to break up the problem into "natural" parts---like sales, marketing, 
production, etc.--and do the easy parts first. 
Generally, salnnzi strategies emphasize change in technology platforms. Within 
specific functional areas--like sales--salami tactics can produce important though limited 
organizational changes. 
The advantage of snlami is that it focuses scarce personnel and system resources 
on a small part of the problem for maximum effect. Most VLSS really are too big to 
attempt a single planned rebuild. With snlanzi, interim deliverable targets can be met, 
resources can be minimized, and personnel have a chance to learn by doing as they explore 
new technology and business design principles in limited areas. The damage done by 
errors with salnnli is less than with more ambitious designs. While slow to deliver 
completed VLSS--it may take ten years--eventually the firm arrives. 
The disadvantages of salanli follow from its virtues--there is a distinct prospect 
that in five years you will end up with some high tech parts that cannot be tied together, 
which do not share data, and that are built according to different principles learned over 
time. The result is a garden of applications which do not fit together. However, fitting 
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things together can be someone else's problem, and salami is therefor a popular, 
reasonable sounding strategy, which produces results according to schedule. 
Hire out: somebody kno~vs how. 
Increasingly organizations faced with rebuilding their own VLSS turn to outside 
consultants and system integrators. The fastest growing segment of the computer service 
industry--as major accounting firms have demonstrated--is systems integration. In large 
part this is due to the problems faced by the Fortune 1000 in rebuilding their VLSS. 
Many CIOs have decided that the internal system staff is overwhelmed just 
operating the existing systems, or they simply lack the skills to  be build contemporary 
systems appropriate to the fbture ten years. Many times the organization does not have a 
"grand vision" to implement, and no one in the organization has any idea about how to do 
business five or ten years from now. Therefore, proponents argue, turning to outsiders 
who are skilled, experienced, and creative is a wise move. 
Generally, the most skilled programmer/analysts, systems analysts, and system 
designers end up working for the systems integrators simply because the salaries are so 
high. Moreover, these skilled persons have been exposed to a much wider variety of 
technologies and organizations than your own staff. On the surface, pursuing this 
strategy seems to lower the risk presented by internal development of systems, and seems 
to offer the best opportunity for developing state of the art systems suited for the fbture 
decade. 
System integrators usually do not understand the specifics of your firm, and often 
times do not undertand the dynamics of your own industry especially if there experience is 
developed in other industries. For this reason, system integrators tend to be excellent at 
managing technical platform changes but they do poorly when it comes to organizational 
process change. As one CIO noted based on his experience with a well known system 
integrator, "They were fine when we told them to run the data center. The "took" the 
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Data Center like real Marines--which many of them were. But when we asked them to 
think, when we asked them to integrate closely the tens of sub-projects, or when we asked 
them to take a critical look at the direction we were moving, they did miserably." 
Unfortunately, success with external system integrators and accounting firms as 
VLSS rebuilders is no higher than flipping a coin and there are as many disaster stories as 
success stories. 
The problems are multiple and serious. The insight of system integrators into the 
future of your business and industry is usually no better than yours, and often worse. 
Hence, system integrators cannot be relied on to do your thinking. Integrators typically 
cannot transfer skills to your staff, so you will be dependent on them forever. Your staff 
tends to resent outside integrators and consultants, and miscommunication or non 
communication grows as the project proceeds. If you think managing a large project is 
diflicult, imagine what it is like when the staff is fighting with outside consultants, and 
communication of any helphl sort is non-existent. 
If you are dissatisfied with the results of system integrators, you tend to be locked 
in--afterall, they are the only one's who really "know your system." Experience has found 
that external system integrators are no better estimating ultimate costs or delivery 
schedules than your own staff--which is miserable. 
Despite its growing popularity, reliance on external problem solvers exposes you 
to a great deal of risk, at a high cost, and diminishes the development of your own staff. 
You may get a system, but it will almost certainly be over budget and behind schedule, and 
you will not have created the conditions for growing powerful, robust systems in the 
future. 
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Grand Design: Let's do it right. 
Grand design is the most serious VLSS rebuild strategy if only because it is the 
most ambitious, expensive, and risky of all the strategies. The rewards of grand design 
can be significant although a long time in coming (more than five years). These 
characteristics make grand design highly desirable to managers who appreciate taking 
risks, and to vendors of hardware and software equipment. Other organizational players 
tend to resist grand design because it promises to bring significant organizational change. 
Grand design is the only strategy that correctly diagnoses a major part of the 
problem: there is an intimate connection between the basic metaphor of the business, the 
day to day procedures, and the business VLSS. You cannot change one without changing 
the others. Second, in order to seriously rebuild VLSS taking maximum advantage of 
contemporary technology, you will need to change the software, and databases, as well as 
the hardware and telecommunications. Third, a major redesign of the business strategy 
and procedures will be required both to drive the system rebuilding process as well as to 
simplify the traditional practices. Briefly, a new vision is needed of what the business is all 
about and how to do it. Grand designs imply a "frame breaking" change in the business. 
Grand design exercises the talents of strategic planners, CEO's who like to make 
strategic plans, and organizational staffers who like carrying out detailed plans over long 
periods. More than any other strategy, Graizd design promises to "do it rightu--to build 
integrated, state of the art systems which are carefblly crafted to support a fbture vision of 
the business. In the few cases where grand design has worked, the results have been 
spectacular 
Unfortunately, most grand designs are not successfblly implemented. Redesigning 
the business procedures, rules, and strategies, while at the same time trying to redesign the 
support software, databases, hardware, and telecommunications, proves to be a totally 
overwhelming task for corporate staffs no matter how big and no matter what technique 
of planning or technology of planning is used. In the absence of clear-cut information 
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requirements (which cannot be given because the business design is not yet solidified in 
the minds of planners), systems people tend to overcompensate by buying more of 
whatever hardware is available just in case it might be needed. 
The end result of grand design is usually a new collection of hardware--that 
afterall is the easy part of systems. When it comes to software and data, the end result is 
typically busted budgets and products not delivered as described in the early part of this 
paper. Because all that works is the new hardware running the old software, that tends to 
be what is accomplished. 
A federal study of grand designs in government found that senior management 
often did not understand the commitment of time and effort required, that staff was often 
not available or not skilled to carry out the plan, and that it was impossible to coordinate 
all the organizational players. [see panel for top ten problems] 
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Leading Problems of Grand Design Strategies 
Problem Total* 
1. Top management lack of understanding 34.3 
2, Staffing problems 32.8 
3 .  Lack of acquisition skills 29.0 
4. Protests from contractors 28.6 
5. Problems that occur when falling behind 28.3 
6. Coordination problems 28.1 
7. Inappropriate organizational placement 27.6 
8. Audits by GAO 27.4 
9. Problems with procurement regulations 27.4 
10. Unrealistic time schedules set by others 26.6 
"Survey of 21 senior federal managers involved in the design and installation of 10 Grand 
Design federal systems. Respondents were asked to score the problem in four areas 
(planning, procurement, implementation, and operation) on a 10 point scale (l=not very 
important, 10= extremely important). The scores were totalled across the four areas. The 
maximum possible score in each problem area is 40, the minimum possible is 4. 
Source: Francis A. McDonough, "An Evaluation of the Grand Design Approach to 
Developing Computer Based Application Systems," United States General Services 
Administration, Information Resources Management Service, September 1988. 
The problems of grazzd design are typically complicated by the on-going 
organizational crisis--as described earlier-- of which the VLSS is a significant part. 
Enormous hopes and considerable pressure is placed on system designers who are often 
seen as the technological messiahs who will deliver the firm into a healthy future. Drastic 
measures are sometimes implemented, like appointing a systems Czar (or in the Federal 
Government a "Trail Boss") to "take command" of the situation. 
What Can Be Done? 
Organizations typically go into and out of focus in terms of systems planning over 
long periods--say 20 years. They fluctuate back and forth from one strategy to  another, 
some working, others not. [see box for history of SSA strategy]. 15 
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SSA's Strategy History 
SSA went through a fascinating historical cycle of VLSS strategies. What 
emerged was never planned, although current plans now support what has emerged. 
As the 1960's equipment and software broke down and deteriorated in the 1970ts, 
in resulting from Congressional and executive branch failure to understand the need for 
modernization, SSA planners in 1978 proposed a grand design approach called Future 
Process. 
F'uture Process sought to totally transform the paper based agency into a 
;ontemporary on-line data base organization. In this plan, regional processing centers 
would be radically changed into electronic storehouses, and 1300 district offices would 
3ffer telephone service to clients. However, this plan generated so much opposition from 
3perations Management and Field Staffs, who feared the impending changes, that it was 
Iropped. 
In 1979, a new Commissioner who was formerly a career officer in the Navy 
~roposed a salami strategy: divide SSA into four main bundles of activity, and sub- 
:ontract each bundle separately in isolation from the others. This strategy was opposed by 
eading members of Congress, the Federal Data Processing establishment at General 
Services Administration, and both systems and operations people at SSA who knew the 
Gture required linkages among the various parts of SSA. The Commissioner soon left the 
igency. 
In 1982, with machines literally breaking down and threats of interruptions to the 
itream of 40 million checks each month, SSA proposed a "technical solution" called the 
jjlstenzs Modernization Plan. The cost was 500 million dollars over five years and sought 
o buy new hardware and rebuild the software and data files. 
While it promised new software and databases, the SMP plan resulted in 1987 
&er five years in new, faster, more powerful central mainframes in Baltimore and 25,000 
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desktop terminals connected to a new data communications system. As noted earlier, not 
changed in the way SSA conducted business with 40 million beneficiaries. 
In 1986 a new Commissioner was appointed, Congress threatened to withhold 
fbnding for SMP because of lack of progress on software, and this forced a "refocussing" 
period on SSA. In response, SSA withdrew SMP and put forth a new plan called the 
Agency Strategic Plan 2000. 
At first glance, this new plan appears to be in the best traditions of a real Grand 
Design: a new way of doing business is defined, one largely based on electronic 
interactions with citizens. A ten year, multi billion dollar effort is contemplated. 
But oddly, much of the new plan is already operating although some parts require 
still more hardware. From 1986 to 1989 SSA refocused its software efforts recognizing 
that it had seriously underestimated in 1982 the time and cost of rewriting 12 million lines 
of code. SSA managers also realized, as outside consultants and Congressional 
researchers had been arguing, that a new vision of how to run the agency was needed, a 
vision based on new models of doing business--800 telephone service, ATM like cards, 
reach out programs to clients like private insurance companies, electronic interaction with 
clients, and so forth. 
SSA management has successf5lly implemented a new on-line, interactive, 
telecommunications driven customer support service which processes much of the work 
involved in its largest program--RSI (Retirement and Survivors Insurance). 
In the end, SSA managers pulled off one of the more remarkable transformations 
of a K S S .  A paper oriented, batch processing organization is now well on its way to 
becoming a contemporary on-line, telecommunications oriented service agency. The 
transformation required seven years, somewhere between 500 million to one billion dollars 
(depending on how one counts and where one stops counting), the efforts of a 2000 
person systems staff, and a large group of Congressional critics and private consultants 
(sometimes estimated by SSA senior management to be equal in size to the systems staff). 
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Most important, the transformation was much more evolutionary than anticipated. 
Contemporary plans for the fbture are much more evolutionary than earlier plans. Real 
organizational learning has occurred. 
Of course most organizations would have expired under this load. SSA benefitted 
from the fact that American society would not let SSA die regardless of conservative 
attempts to kill it off, or because of shear incompetence. 
SSA's transformation did not proceed according to plan, but it did proceed, and it 
did achieve a desirable result. In many respects, the goals of the original rejected Futzire 
Process plan of 1978 have finally been achieved. 
If we look back historically at VLSS rebuild efforts there seem to be two kinds of 
risks to  avoid. One nasty risk to avoid is a technology shopping spree which locks the 
business into an information architecture for the next decade. This strategy offers a 
solution, but one which can be fatal in the long run. A second nasty risk is trying t o  do 
everything at once--a p n d  design. Here are two simple ways to avoid both pitfalls. 
Make the problenz big enozigh to sohe 
The best way to avoid succumbing to technical solutions is to ask you and your 
staff to spend some considerable time thinking about the problem. In most cases of VLSS 
failure, the failure is the result of a long term pattern of decline in technology, a growth in 
organizational complexity, and a decline in staff skills and morale. People and 
organizational problems are just as important as technology problems. You must discover 
what the people and organizational problems are before permitting technology solutions to 
run away with budgets and schedules. 
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A good place to look for organizational problems is in the very design of the 
production and service delivery process. Often what happens is that a cumbersome, 
complex, and error prone set of organizational procedures inherited from the distant past 
becomes entrenched in the business, and existing systems have attempted to automate 
these manual procedures. 
For instance, at the Social Security Administration there was an initial failure in 
1982 to rethink business procedures. Existing software was written to support a manual 
paper process invented in 1936. New machines were purchased in the 1982-1985 period 
in order to make the old software work faster. The result was that in 1986--four years 
and 400 million dollars after the project began--the 1936 business practices of SSA were 
indeed more efficient, but service to the public, productivity, and staff morale was not 
markedly higher. 
From 1986 to 1989 SSA refocused its efforts using teleprocessing and telephone 
service as the vision of the future SSA. It wrote software to support this new vision and 
ultimately succeeded by 1989 in establishing a modern, interactive, telecommunications 
based business interface with the public. 
Most private companies do not have the luxury of 400 million dollar budgets. In 
the private sector, a mistake in defining the problem as merely technological may very well 
mean the death of the firm. The historical lesson of VLSS is clear: if you throw MIPS and 
hardware at the existing procedures, if you fail to simplify the business procedures first 
before designing new K S S ,  if you fail to develop a new vision of how to  do business in 
the next decade, most of the potential efficiency gains of new technology will be lost. 
The poor track record of information technology in the service sector to markedly 
increase productivity is one indication that many firms have thrown considerable computer 
resources at problems but not achieved the productivity gains that they anticipated. 16 
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Opportunism crnd the E1)olz4tion of I/LSS 
You may not have the luxury to redesign or rethink the business in the short term. 
SSA and most large businesses cannot stop existing systems to rethink the business. 
There is an immediate crisis often which needs a solution. What can be done in this 
situation? 
You should make use of the fact that most VLSS evolve over long periods of time, 
and you should prepare yourself for an immediate survival strategy. SSA's strategic 
history is instructive [see box]. SSA's new VLSS required seven years to evolve and 
followed a survival tactic which involved enormous hardware investment in the old 
software just to survive. But the same computer and telecommunications hardware 
needed to survive could be used to operate more sophisticated and much better software 
which supported an entire new way of doing business in the future. No doubt serendipity 
and plain luck played a role here as well as management insight. 
A large telecommunications firm followed a similar strategy. Faced with ancient 
software operating on saturated, aging machines, this firm employed a survival tactic 
similar to SSA's: it isolated the old files and software in a "core" database, purchased 
enormous computing power to speed up transaction processing, and developed a user 
friendly front end which isolated applications developers and users from the core data and 
files [see box]. 
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Picture: Building An Envelope to Survive 
Caption: Building a survival envelope around existing files and software may buy enough 
time for the more difficult task of organization and system redesign. 
In other words, just to survive, this firm built an envelope around its traditional files and 
software. 
Now with survival assured, it is possible to evolve new business procedures and 
the underlying files and software to support them. But the process is expected to take 
more than five years, to proceed in an evolutionary and adaptive manner, according to a 
flexible plan which optimizes locally, and exploits advantages as they become apparent. 
While a great deal has been written about the strategic advantages available to 
firms who effectively use information technology, the historical evidence suggests as well 
that periodically systems become strategic liabilities. Huge embedded base systems 
developed to automate old business strategies and procedures become corporate 
loadstones. At moments of strategic transitions in an industry, these aging K S S  can 
contribute to further decline. All Fortune 1000 firms who have survived the last decade 
have such systems. In the late 90s we will have to learn how to rebuild these systems as 
we redesign our core business activities. 
' . My colleague in this work was Professor Alan F. Westin, Columbia University. The 
results of this work are forthcoming. See Alan F. Westin and Kenneth C. Laudon, 
Information Technology at the Social Security Administration, 193 5- 1990. 
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2 .  See "ADP Modernization. IRS' Tax System Redesign Progress and Plans for the 
Future," Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, April, 1988. See also 
Government Computer News, march 6, 1989. 
3 .  See "Patent Files Vs. Computer Age," The New York Times, September 12, 1988. 
4 .  General Accounting Office, "WWMMCS Continued Problems," Comptroller General of 
the United States, March 1989. For an earlier report which identifies the same problems 
see "The World Wide Military Command and control Information System--Problems in 
Information Resource Management," Comptroller General of the United States, General 
Accounting Ofice, October 19, 198 1. 
5 .  See "Strategic Systems Plans Gone Awry," Computerworld, March 14, 1988. 
6 .  Ibid 
7 .  The only exception here is Robert W. Zmud, "Management of Large Software 
Development Efforts," MIS Quarterly, June 1980. And Robert W. Zmud, "Large Scale 
Interconnected Information Systems," Large Scale Systems, vol. 7, 1984. Both of these 
articles are prescient. Zmud points out the evolutionary nature of large scale systems, the 
need to develop "adaptable" systems, and systems which encourage organizational 
flexibility. 
A few articles in the trade literature address system transformations. See for instance 
Michael Goldstein and John Hagel, "Systems Discontinuity: Roadblock to Strategic 
Change," Datamation, October 15, 1988. And a short piece by Frederic C. Withington, 
"Managing a Systems Transformation," Datamation, August 1, 1988. 
Of course, Frederic P. Brooks' Jr. book The Mythical Man Month (Addison-Wesley, 
1975) which describes the development of the operating system for the IBM 360 machiens 
in the 1960's stands out as a classic contribution to understanding VLSS. Nevertheless, 
Brooks' book dealt with building new systems. Our focus is on the still more complicated 
task of re-building systems in situ. 
8 . For instance, Software Productivity Research Inc. produced a study which claims 
that as program size grows, defects per thousand lines of code grows. And in a report 
they claim that for large scale projects (more than 60,000 lines of code): 
"5% of the projects are cancelled before completion 
*Less than 1% are finished on time, within budget, and meet all user needs. 
*On average, large projects are finished a year late and costs twice as much as 
predicted. 
The report ends up calling for reusable code and more programmer productivity 
even though there is no evidence tthat program errors, lack of productivity, and the like, 
were the principal cause of failure. 
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